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ABSTRACT: Structurally similar economies sharing the same wage-setting 
institutions tend to grow at the same rate, thus preserving their differences in levels of 
output per capita and employment rate, if the value of the workers’ outside options is 
rigid and equal across economies. In this case, i) multiple balanced growth paths can 
be possible, ii) the sustainable rate of growth is higher in economies with competitive 
wage determination than it is in unionized economies, and iii) this growth differential 
becomes larger in the presence of an integrated capital market. As the workers’ 
outside option depends on fiscal transfers responding to changes in levels of output 
and employment, there is convergence in levels across structurally and institutionally 
similar economies. In this case, i) economies with competitive wage setting converge 
at higher levels of output per capita and employment rate than do unionized 
economies, ii) economies with the same wage-setting institutions converge at higher 
levels if the tax rate and the fiscal transfers in favour of the jobless are reduced, and 
iii) the steady-state (“natural”) rate of employment characterizing a regional economy 
is higher—other things being equal—the lower is the steady-state rate of employment 
of the other region, when a central government pays equal benefits to all jobless 
households living in this two-region economy. 
KEY WORDS: Convergence, on-the-job training, physical capital, human capital, 
skilled labor, multiple equilibria, fiscal transfers, coordination failure. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
 What growth and employment paths are sustainable depend on the structural 
and institutional characteristics of the economy. In particular, the modalities of wage 
determination can affect the process by which resources strategic for growth i.e., 
physical capital and skilled labor, are accumulated, thus influencing growth and 
employment patterns.  
 Dealing with these issues, the general-equilibrium model presented in this 
paper may help explaining the different growth and employment performances of the 
advanced economies in recent years. Its main aims are the following:  
i) To show how initial differentials in output per capita and employment rate between  
structurally similar economies sharing the same labor-market institutions cannot 
vanish in the long run if the opportunities of workers without jobs are rigid and equal 
across these economies (typically because home activities have the same value for a 
worker no matter where s/he is located). In contrast, when the workers’ outside 
opportunities depend on fiscal transfers responding to changes in the output and 
employment performances of each economy, initial differences between economies 
that are structurally and institutionally similar tend to disappear in the long-run, with 
the economies converging to the same steady-state level of output per capita and to the 
same “natural” employment rate.   
ii) To shows that with the workers’ outside opportunities equalized across economies, 
an economy characterized by competitive wage determination tends to grow at a 
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higher rate than an economy in which unions negotiate wages. Furthermore, it shows 
that when the workers’ outside opportunities depend on fiscal transfers, the steady-
state level of output per capita and the “natural” employment rate are higher if the 
wages are determined competitively rather than being union determined or—given the 
modality of wage determination—if the fiscal transfers are lower. Finally, in the 
context of a two-region economy with a central government paying equal benefits to 
all jobless households, it shows that the natural rate of employment characterizing a 
region is higher—other things being equal—the lower is the natural rate of 
employment of the other region. 
iii) To show that the existence of an integrated capital market favours the economy 
enjoying a competitive advantage because of its labor-market institutions, lowering 
the steady-state rate of growth of the economy whose modalities of wage 
determination are less favourable to growth. 
iv) Again in a context where the value of the workers’ outside opportunities does not 
respond to the levels of output and employment, to show that multiple balanced 
growth paths are possible, so that more than one long-term interest rate is consistent 
with market “fundamentals”. 
 The paper is organized as it follows: Section 1 provides the factual and 
theoretical premises of the paper. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 
characterizes an equilibrium path and solves the model for the case in which the 
insiders’ unions have control over the wage setting process. Section 4 solves the 
model for the case in which there are market-determined wages. Section 5 
characterizes the equilibrium path as a country with union-determined wages and a 
country with market-determined wages coexisting in the presence of perfect capital 
mobility. In section 6 the possibility of multiple equilibrium paths is discussed, while 
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in section 7 the assumption is relaxed that the workers’ outside opportunities do not 
respond to the conditions prevailing in the economy. The final section summarizes the 
main results of the paper.  
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 In the last two decades, differences in GDP per capita between European 
regions have appeared to be quite persistent (Neven and Gouyette 1995, Fagerberg and 
Verspagen 1996).1 Typically, regions with lower level of GDP per capita tend to be 
those having the higher rate of unemployment (Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniëls 
1997). Moreover, it is often the case that depressed areas exhibit lower rates of labor 
force participation2 and have relatively large underground economies.3 However, in 
spite of long-lasting (and rising) differentials in regional unemployment rates, 
interregional migration flows have declined and then remained very low in the last 
two decades.4 In Southern Europe, in particular, where some of the regions with the 
highest unemployment rates are located, unemployment is closely concentrated among 
                                                      
1
 In the case of Italy, there are many studies showing the lack of convergence in GDP per capita 
between southern regions and the rest of Italy in the last 25 years (GDP per capita in the South 
as a fraction of GDP per capita in the rest of Italy was .607 in 1972 and .567 in 1997). Among 
these studies, see Cosci and Mattesini 1995, Boltho et al. 1995, Cellini and Scorcu 1997, 
Fabiani and Pellegrini 1997, Paci and Saba 1998.  
2
 This is particularly true for Italy, where there is a significant and persistent differential in 
participation rates between the South and the rest of the country, which is mainly due to the 
difference in the female participation rate (in 1995 only 33.7 % of the southern women aged  
15-64 were in the labor force, while for Italy as a whole the corresponding figure was 43.2%). 
As it is well known, changes in labor force participation seem to play a larger role in Europe 
than in the USA to adjust movements in labor demand (see Decressin and Fatás 1995). 
3
 In 1993 about one third of total labor units in South Italy were estimated to be irregular 
(against 18% in the rest of the country). 
4
 This is true both for Italy (Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa 1991, Faini et al. 1996) and for 
Spain (Bentolila and Jimeno 1998).   
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young people and—especially in South Italy—among first-job seekers.5 Finally, there 
is a correlation between regional net fiscal transfers and regional unemployment 
(Obstfeld and Peri 1998), which may support the hypothesis that a relatively high 
government transfers in favour of households located in depressed areas have 
contributed to raise and keep high the reservation wage of the workers living in these 
areas, also depressing their participation rate and their propensity to migrate.6  
 The existence of these fiscal transfers may be one of the reasons why wages  
are not particularly sensitive to local labor market imbalances.7 Moreover, in the 
presence of these massive transfers, it is doubtful that decentralizing the wage-
bargaining process at the regional level will be sufficient to differentiate wages 
according to local labor-market conditions,8 since fiscal transfers and welfare 
entitlements tend to equalize the workers’ outside opportunities across regions of the 
same country. 
                                                      
5
 At the end of 1997, 44.7% of the Italian unemployed were first-job seekers, and 61% were 
aged less than 30.  
6
 Fiscal transfers and taxes affect employment by changing the ratio between net wages and the 
monetized value of remaining at home (see Phelps 1997 and Pissarides 1998). On the role of 
fiscal transfers in South Italy, see Micossi and Tullio 1991, Mazzotta 1998, Brunello et al. 
1999. 
7
 In Italy, regional differentials in unemployment rates do not appear to exert a significant 
influence on wages (see Faini 1995). In the formal segment of the economy, where minimum 
wages are negotiated at national level, some evidence shows that wage determination is not 
affected by the southern unemployment rate (Bodo and Sestito 1991, Brunello et al. 1999). 
However, even in the small-firm sector, wages are not very sensitive to excess supply in the 
local labor market (Casavola et al.1995). Also in Spain there is evidence showing that in spite 
of the large and persistent differentials in regional unemployment rates, real wages do not differ 
significantly between high-unemployment and low-unemployment regions (Mauro et al. 1999). 
8
 For a model showing that centralized wage-setting should be discouraged and skilled labor 
mobility should be favoured in order to foster regional convergence, see Faini 1999. 
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 However, it is likely that generous fiscal transfers are not the only explanation 
of the relatively high reservation wages that are observed in some depressed areas. In 
these areas, indeed, there are fewer opportunities for using the skills acquired while 
working in entry-level jobs. This lowers the expected return on the investment that a 
worker undertakes when s/he accepts a relatively low entry-wage in order to receive 
training on the job, thereby raising the minimum wage at which s/he is willing to 
accept such a job. In its turn, this dissuades firms from locating their plants in these 
areas.
9
 Thus created is a vicious circle comprising low probability of finding “good” 
jobs, low investment for the creation of new good jobs and for active participation in 
the good labor market,10 coupled with a relatively extended informal economy offering 
badly-paid work opportunities for unskilled workers and little possibility for the 
acquisition of skills. 
 The existence of such “traps” is explained in the literature by stressing the 
strategic complementarities between investment in physical capital, in R&D, or in the 
creation of jobs, on the one hand, and investment to acquire the required human 
capital and to conduct a job search on the other. These strategic complementarities 
depend on the fact that one type of investment would have higher expected returns and 
would have been increased if also the other type of investment were increased (e.g. see 
Cooper and John 1988). Hence, the presence of these complementarities may generate 
multiple equilibria and lead to coordination failures: in the absence of some 
institutional device coordinating the individual expectations and actions, decentralized 
                                                      
9
 In other words, the small number of good firms restricts the availability of career paths based 
on job-to-job mobility, which would allow workers to reap the returns on the investment made 
by accepting a lower entry wage.  
10
 The discouraging effect exerted by the low probability of finding a job on female labor 
market participation is documented by Casavola et al. 1995. 
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decision makers can give rise to Pareto-suboptimal outcomes (Burdett and Smith 
1995, Acemoglu 1996, Redding 1996, Snower 1996).11 
 Given the possibility of multiple equilibria, the present paper invokes the 
centrality of the capital market in selecting the trajectory of the employment level. It 
accepts the idea that in contemporary capitalism the conventional opinions held by 
capital-market participants may have a role in shaping the future of an economy.12 
Since more than one equilibrium paths is consistent with market fundamentals and 
institutions, the economy will move along an equilibrium path characterized by high 
growth only if market participants are convinced that this growth scenario is 
sustainable—that is, if they believe that firms' future profitability is able to guarantee 
a sufficiently high rate of return on the larger amount of resources invested. In these 
circumstances, the upward pressure on the cost of capital exerted by increased demand 
for capital is accomodated by an adequate increase in capital supply. The externalities 
positively correlated to the growth rate of the economy are crucial in preventing the 
rate of return on capital from falling along a path characterized by more capital 
accumulation, thus validating the optimistic opinions prevailing in the capital market. 
In other words, it is only if the capital-market participants believe in the sustainability 
of a high growth rate that they will generate a flow of resources sufficient to finance 
(at an acceptable cost for the productive sector) buoyant investment activity by firms.  
                                                      
11
 In Saint-Paul (1994a and 1994b), the workers may prefer the low-skill equilibrium to the 
high-skill equilibrium, because the higher demand for education reduces national savings, 
pushing up real interest and unemployment rates.  
12
 Ciocca and Nardozzi (1995) convincingly discuss the conventions underlying the attitudes of 
the financial markets in order to explain the movements of real interest in the OECD countries 
since the early 1960s. 
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 This paper therefore challenges the proposition that the interest rates of 
efficient capital markets are always able to coordinate intertemporal activities 
appropriately (see Leijonhufvud 1995). Since the economy can gravitate around 
multiple equilibrium paths, appropriate policies and institutions are advisable because 
of their role in averting a coordination failure and in achieving a Pareto-superior 
outcome (Hahn and Solow 1995, chapt.7; Colander and van Ees 1996). Indeed, as 
more than one equilibrium path is possible, it is not necessarily the case that a long-
term trade-off between employment and real wage emerges: along a trajectory 
characterized by a higher rate of growth, both the employment level and the average 
real wage tend to be higher than when the economy follows a low-growth path. In 
accordance with this approach, the role of economic policy is to provide a consistent 
and reliable framework able to enforce the convention favourable to a high growth 
scenario, convincing the financial markets of its sustainability (see Ciocca and 
Nardozzi 1995). 
 It is hard to believe that structurally similar economies may exhibit non-
vanishing differentials in per capita product for long periods of time only because of 
the  self-fulfilling nature of rational expectations. An explanation stressing the crucial 
role of the “animal spirits” as determinants of growth should consistently argue that it 
would be sufficient to "help" the agents to coordinate their expectations—thereby 
enabling them to converge on the desired growth path--for the undesired disparities 
among economies to be rapidly eliminated. Given that these disparities may persist for 
decades, it is unlikely that such jumps can be made possible simply by helping the 
agents to form the "right" expectations. In other words, the existence of persistent 
differentials across regions or countries prompts one to search for plausible 
mechanisms able to amplify the effects of transitory shocks and to determine 
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cumulative processes. These mechanisms rely on fact that the endowments of 
resources strategic for growth depend on history: the body of knowledge, the state of 
technology and the stock of human, social and physical capital result from rates of 
innovation, discovery and accumulation in the past. Therefore, persistence can be 
generated because a period of high (low) growth has left the economy with increased 
(depleted) stocks of the resources required for a self-propelled growth process, with 
long-lasting effects on the economy. 
 The persistence-causing mechanism formalized in this paper emphasizes that 
the availability of experienced and trained workers is not independent of history, 
because experience and training can be acquired by working. Therefore, the existence 
in the past of firms which offered opportunities for training on the job, and for 
acquiring experience and abilities, increases the current endowment of human capital 
in the economy, thereby boosting productivity growth.13 This implies that formal 
education cannot substitute for learning by doing,14 even if it is a pre-condition for it: 
                                                      
13
  Empirical data seem to confirm the contribution made to total factor productivity by the 
learning process which takes place when machinery and technologies are used (see, for 
example, De Long and Summers 1992). There is also empirical support for the hypothesis that 
a shortage of qualified workers has negative effects on productivity growth (for 
microeconometric evidence concerning the United Kingdom, see Haskel and Martin 1996). 
14
 The informal acquisition of skills and the availability of these skills in certain areas because 
of previous settlements, which sometimes originated in pre-industrial traditions, have been very 
important for the formation and evolution of Italian industrial districts, that consist mainly of 
networks of small firms. These districts, which are located in the northern and central regions 
of the country (with very few exceptions), constitute the core of the Italian manifacturing sector 
and generate a very large portion of Italian exports. Conversely, the depressed South of Italy is 
well endowed with formally educated people (in the South the share of population with higher 
school degrees is even higher than in the richer North!). This notwithstanding, entrepreneurs 
often complain about the difficulty of finding in the South the skilled workers that they need in 
the South (Banca d’Italia 1995, Istituto G. Tagliacarne 1996). Confirming the existence of a 
“low-skill, bad-job” trap, one should note that--in an environment offering relatively few good-
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possession of basic formal education is necessary to be able to learn on the job.15 In the 
model, this strict complementarity is captured by assuming that a worker can be hired 
by a good firm giving him/her training on the job only if s/he invested to become 
“trainable”, i.e., if s/he invested to participate actively in the good job market. 
 The model here presented allows to derive permanent differentials in the 
steady-state rate of growth of output and employment or in the steady-state levels of 
output and employment across economies with different structural parameters and 
wage-setting processes. Therefore, it is consistent with both a “full” hysteresis 
approach and an intertemporal equilibrium endogenous natural rate approach to 
unemployment. We have mentioned that persistent differentials in output per head and 
employment rate between areas structurally and institutionally similar but endowed 
with different initial stocks of human and physical capital can become permanent only 
if the long-term adjustment process based on the relative weakening of the market 
position of workers located in the poorer areas cannot take place. In this case, the 
paper points to the conclusion that in the long-run the growth rate of employment is 
higher when wage determination responds, not to insiders’ pressure, but to external 
market forces. Moreover, an area in which wages are competitively determined is 
better able to exploit its competitive advantage in the presence of an integrated capital 
market because it it is able to attract capital from the area in which insiders’ pressure 
                                                                                                                                             
job opportunities in the private sector--a disproportionately large number of southern Italians 
obtain school degrees that can give access almost exclusively to public jobs, thus increasing the 
pressure to inflate the public sector (Paganetto and Scandizzo 1996, Bonatti and Borzaga 1998). 
15
 This complementarity is supported by OECD 1991, which emphasizes that on average less 
formal schooling seems to lead to more limited training opportunities and possibilities to 
augment human capital. 
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is stronger, thus damping the steady-state rate of growth of the less competitive area16. 
However, even in the case where a long-term adjustment can take place, and the 
differences in output per head and employment rate between areas structurally and 
institutionally similar tend to disappear,17 the paper suggests that in the long run the 
level of output per capita and rate of employment is higher when wages are 
competitively determined rather than subject to insiders’ pressure or—given the 
modality of wage determination—when fiscal transfers in favour of the jobless are 
reduced. In this respect, this paper seeks to give rigour to the widespread notion that 
labor-market institutions more responsive to competitive forces are conducive to 
better growth and employment performances, and thereby improving our 
understanding of why the U.S. experience has differed quite drammatically from that 
of continental Europe in recent years18. 
 
                                                      
16
 In recent years, the comparative advantage enjoyed by the USA versus continental Europe in 
terms of labor market institutions has been often mentioned as one of the feature explaining the 
dissappointing performance of many European countries in attracting direct investment vis-à-
vis the ability of the U.S. to attract it. 
17
  The long-term adjustment mechanism stressed here follows Phelps (1994) in emphasizing 
the importance for workers of relying on sources of support that do not depend on having a 
regular job. In Phelps, convergence in the natural rate of unemployment between structurally 
and institutionally similar economies can occur because the real and financial assets (together 
with the welfare entitlements) held by the workers located in an economy affected by a high 
unemployment rate tend to decline relatively to the non-labor sources of support available to 
workers located in a similar economy characterized by lower unemployment. 
18
 Among the recent papers focusing on the role of labor-market institutions in explaining cross-
country differences in unemployment rates, see Nickell 1997, and Blanchard and Wolfers 1999. 
The model here presented seeks to take into account of the four labor-market features that 
according to Nickell (1997) are associated with  high unemployment in Europe: i) generous 
transfers in favour of the jobless, ii) high unionization with wages bargained collectively and 
without coordination, iii) high overall taxes, and iv) poor educational standards at the bottom 
end of the labor market. 
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2.  THE BASIC MODEL 
 
We consider an infinite-horizon economy in discrete time. The relevant agents 
are the  the firms, the investors and the workers. 
Population’s dynamics 
 Individuals are finitely lived: they have a strictly positive and constant 
probability σ , 0<σ<1, of dying in each period t. Thus, the probability of dying in a 
certain period is assumed to be independent of the age of the individual; and it is also 
assumed that the mortality rate of each large group of individuals does not fluctuate 
stochastically even though each individual's lifespan is uncertain. This implies that at 
the end of t a constant fraction σ of individuals belonging to each group and living in 
location i, i∈[0,n], n>0, dies, while a new cohort is born at the beginning of the 
following period.  
The firms 
 There is a continuum--of measure n--of locations. In each location i there is a 
large number (normalized to be one) of identical firms. Locations differ with respect 
to the specific shock affecting them in each period. Indeed, in each period t the 
representative firm located in i (the "i firm") produces the output Yit according to the 
constant-returns-to-scale technology 
αα )A+(SKx=Y itit-1ititit Ω , 0<α<1,  0<Ω<1,     (1)  
where xit is a random variable taking a value in period t which is specific to the i 
location, Kit is the physical capital that the i firm borrowed at the end of the previous 
period to carry out production in t, Sit are the experienced workers (the "skilled 
workers") employed by the i firm in t, Ait are the newly hired workers (the 
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"apprentices") of the i firm in t. Note that the apprentices are less productive than the 
experienced workers (Ω<1), and that aggregate output is given by  Yt= Y di.it
0
n∫  
 The random variable xit is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval 
[0,n]. Moreover, it is identically distributed across locations and periods, and 
independently distributed across periods. In each t, xit takes a different value in each 
location, with xit varying continuously across locations. This implies that the average 
value of xit across locations is not a random variable and does not fluctuate in time, 
even though individual firms are uncertain about their local xit (no aggregate 
uncertainty).19 
 The period net profits nitpi  (net of the cost of capital) of the i firm are given 
by: 
g
it
n
it pipi = -[(1+rt)-(1-δ)]Kit=Yit-vitSit-eitAit-[(1+rt)-(1-δ)]Kit, 0<δ<1,    (2)  
where gitpi  are the firm's gross profits, vit is the real wage paid by the i firm to the 
skilled workers employed in t, eit is the entry wage paid by the i firm to the 
apprentices hired in period t, δ is a capital depreciation parameter, and rt is the (real) 
interest rate, i.e. the market rate at which firms borrowed capital at the end of the 
previous period. Interest payment and reimbursement of principal are due at the end of 
t. The interest rate is unique because capital is perfectly mobile across locations at the 
end of each period, while mobility is infinitely costly within the period: once 
                                                      
19
 In other words, if K = K
n
 S = S
n
 and A = A
n
 i and t,it it it, , ∀ ∀  then 
Y n2 (S + A)  t.t
-
= ∀K1 α αΩ ,  
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borrowed and installed at the end of t-1, a firm's capital stock must remain fixed until 
the end of t.  
The investors 
 There is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical investors who are 
the firms' owners: for simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that all 
investors are entitled to receive an equal share of the firms' net profits. Moreover, the 
investors are the owners of the firms’ productive assets: investors must decide in each 
t what fraction of their gross returns on  wealth to spend on consumption rather than 
on buying productive assets to be lent at the end of the period to firms. Hence, the 
problem of the representative investor amounts to deciding a contingency plan for 
consumption intC  and holding of productive assets Kt+1 in order to maximize the 
lifetime expected sequence of discounted period utilities )C( intg :  
 ,0'' ,0' ,10 ),-1( ,)C(E )(
0t
in
t
t
0 ≤>≤<≡∑∞
=
ggg τστθθ     (3) 
i. given  Kdi,  ,diK  K,K)r1(C Ksubject to i0
n
0
n
it
n
t
n
0
itt
n
ttt
in
t1+t ∀==++≤+ ∫∫ pipipi
 In (3), τ is a time-preference parameter, Kt and ntpi are, respectively, aggregate capital 
and aggregate (net) profits. Furthermore, Et is an expectation operator conditional on 
the information available in t as the values taken by xit across locations are known. 
Expectations are rational, in the sense that they are consistent with the model and are 
generated by optimally processing the available information. Finally, for simplicity 
and without loss of generality, we rule out the existence of actuarally fair annuities 
paid to the living investors by a financial institution collecting their wealth as they die: 
the wealth of someone who dies is inherited by some newly born individual  
(accidental bequests). 
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The skilled workers  
 Skilled workers are those who have been trained on the job while working in a 
firm for at least one period. In contrast, apprentices are workers with no work 
experience, but who have been hired by a firm after having invested to participate 
actively in the labor market. In their working lives, workers never lose the general 
skills that they have acquired. Being general, the skills acquired on the job are 
perfectly transferable. Thus, the evolution of the skilled labor force in the entire 
economy is governed by 
Mt+1=(1-σ)(Mt+At),  di,AA ,diMM
n
0
itt
n
0
itt ∫∫ ==  M0 given,   (4) 
where Mit are the skilled workers located in i at the beginning of period t.  
 As in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), workers choose location ex ante (at 
the end of t-1), while firms decide on labor input once uncertainty is resolved. As for 
capital, labor is perfectly mobile across locations at the end of each period, while 
mobility is infinitely costly within one period. This short-term immobility implies that 
those workers not employed in their location are not employed at all. 
 At the beginning of period t, a skilled worker located in i has the following 
period expected utility:  
,w v,0'' 0,' )],w()p-1()v(p[E~u tittititittskit ≥≤>+= uuuu    (5) 
where tE
~
 is an expectation operator conditional on the information available at the 
beginning of period t (as the realization of xit is not yet known), wt is the monetized 
value of the workers’ outside option depending only on the value of non-market 
(home) activities (this assumption will be removed in section 7), and pit is the fraction 
of the skilled workforce located in i that  is employed in period t:  
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

 ≤
=
otherwise.
MS  if 
M
S
p
  1
itit
it
it
it               (6) 
Note that wt is equal across locations because it does not depend on local market 
conditions. 
 At the end of each period, a skilled worker may move to another location at no 
cost. Obviously, s/he locates where s/he can expect to enjoy the highest lifetime 
utility. Therefore, the discounted sequence of utilities that an optimizing skilled 
worker still alive at the end of t and located in i can expect to gain in the rest of his/her 
lifetime is given by 
Uit
sk
=βEt 1.0 ],)U-(1+[u sk 1+t*isk 1+t*i << βσ                  (7) 
In (7), β is a time-preference parameter, and i* is a location where a skilled worker 
can have the best lifetime prospects (a "best location"):20  
i.UU   ,skit
sk
t*i ∀≥         (8) 
 The entire income earned by the skilled workers working in the formal 
economy is devoted to consuming Yt: 
,vSC itit
sk
it =          (9) 
where skitC  is total consumption of the good Yt by the skilled workers of location i in 
period t.  
The unskilled workers 
 At the beginning of each period, an unskilled worker located in i must decide 
whether to incur the utility loss associated with participation in the labor market (i.e., 
with searching for a job as an apprentice) or to remain out of the labor market: an 
unskilled worker can be hired by a firm only if s/he invests in labor market 
                                                      
20
 More than one location can share this status of best location. Obviously, a worker located in 
i* will not move. 
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participation, i.e., only if s/he becomes “trainable”. An investment in search activity in 
period t yields a strictly positive probability of being employed only in that period: the 
search must be repeated in subsequent periods if it is unsuccessful in the current 
period and the unskilled worker still wants to have some chance of getting a job. 
Hence, the investment made in order to participate in the labor market will be lost, if 
within one period, the worker does not find an entry job paid at least as his/her 
reservation wage: after having invested in search activity, a trainable worker will 
accept any job offer paying an entry wage larger than his/her reservation wage eitmin . 
An unskilled worker who has decided not to search has the same lifetime prospects as 
a worker who is still unemployed after having incurred the utility loss entailed by this 
search. Therefore, an optimizing unskilled worker living in i can expect at the 
beginning of t to get the lifetime discounted sequence of utilities associated  with the 
best available alternative: 
{ )],)U-(1+)w()(q-1()U)-1()e((q+c)(-[E~maxU~ unittitskititittunit σσ uuh ++=  } (10) ).U-)(U-(1-)w()e()e( ,0'  ,])U-(1+)w([E~  unitskittminititunittt σσ uuuhu =≥>
 
In (10), -h(c) captures the disutility of search (c is the monetized value of this 
disutility) and qit is the fraction of the trainable workforce located in i which is hired 
in period t:  


 ≤
=
otherwise,
LA  if 
L
A
q
  1
itit
it
it
it                          (11) 
where Lit the trainable workforce located in i.  
 Note in (10) that eitmin  (the minimum wage at which a trainable worker is 
willing to accept a job offer) reflects also the expected increase in lifetime well-being 
conditional on receiving some training on the job and becoming a skilled worker. 
Indeed, unitU  is the discounted sequence of utilities that an optimizing unskilled 
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worker still alive at the end of t and located in i can expect to get in the rest of his/her 
lifetime:  
un
itU = )U~(E un 1+t*itβ ,        (12) 
where a best location i* for un unskilled worker must be such that 
i.UU
 ,
un
it
un
t*i ∀≥         (13) 
 The entire income earned by the apprentices is devoted to consuming Yt: 
,eAC itit
un
it =          (14) 
where unitC  is total consumption of the good Yt by the apprentices of location i in t.  
Union-determined wages  
 We have two alternative institutional setups for wage determination. In the 
first one, an insider-outsider scenario is considered. In each location, the wages are 
determined by negotiations held at the beginning of every period between a local 
union unconcerned about the interests of workers with no work experience and the 
local employers' association. In this context it is immaterial whether the union is only 
concerned about the workers employed in the previous period, or about both the latter 
and those experienced workers who were laid off in previous periods. In fact, even if 
the wage setters do not care about the interests of the skilled workers on layoff, the 
latter put pressure on them, insofar as they are perfect substitutes and thereby reduce 
the job security of the employed. 
 The union operating in i negotiates the real wage that all the firms of i must 
pay to the experienced workers in employment, while each individual firm takes its 
decisions on the demand for labor and capital in full autonomy. This negotiation also 
concerns the entry wage, which is established as the fixed fraction µ of the skilled 
workers' wage that firms must pay to the apprentices (eit=µvit). It is realistic to 
assume that the union does not allow the wage differential between skilled workers 
and apprentices fully to offset their productivity differential (Ω<µ≤1), so that any 
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incentive for the employers to replace experienced workers with apprentices is 
suppressed.21  
 The bargaining process can be represented as if each union unilaterally sets 
the real wage in the awareness of its impact on the local firms' decisions. On the other 
hand, each union is aware that the effects of its wage policy on the economy as a 
whole is negligible. Similarly, each single firm perceives that its decisions on labor 
and capital input cannot influence the wage setting process because their impact is 
insignificant relatively to the size of the local labor market. Since the real wage, once 
negotiated, remains fixed for a certain lapse of time (a "period"), it is reasonable to 
assume that the wage is set by the union before the realization of the random variable 
that is relevant for that period.  
 In this decentralized wage setting, the local union operating in i chooses vit in 
order to maximize 
])U-(1+[uE~ skitskitt σ .        (15) 
 In each period the union has full control only over the current wage, if we 
maintain that current union membership cannot commit the workers who will manage 
the union in the future to the pursuit of policies not optimal from their own temporal 
perspective. In other words, a wage policy is feasible only if it is time consistent. 
Hence, the union's problem of choosing the wage in order to maximize (15) can be 
decomposed into a sequence of similar problems that can be solved recursively.  
                                                      
21
 Burdett and Smith (1995) emphasize that the key assumption for the existence of a low skill 
trap is that an employer's profit flow is greater when employing a skilled worker than when 
employing an unskilled worker. Indeed, the fact that firms lay off unskilled workers before 
skilled workers is difficult to reconcile with the contention that unskilled workers are more 
profitable. 
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Market-determined wages 
 
In the alternative institutional setup, we have market-determined wages.  
 
Market forces simultaneously determine vit and Sit in such a way that one has 
or vit>wt entailing Sit=Mit, or Sit<Mit entailing vit=wt. 
 Similarly, market forces simultaneously determine eit and Ait in such a way 
that one has or minitit ee >
 
entailing Ait=Lit, or Ait<Lit entailing 
min
itit ee = . 
A summary of the timing of events 
 Summarizing, in each t we have a sequence of events in the following order: 
i) a new cohort is born; ii) the unions set the wage rates (when the wages are union 
determined), the unskilled workers decide whether to invest in order to participate 
actively in the labor market; iii) idiosynchratic shocks occur; iv) firms atomistically 
determine their demand for skilled workers and apprentices, effective labor supply and 
wages are determined (when the wages are not union determined), production takes 
place and apprentices are trained on the job; v) firms reimburse the principal and pay 
the interest on the capital borrowed at the end of the previous period, firms also pay 
the dividends to the shareholders, new capital is borrowed by the firms for carrying 
out production in the next period; investors decide what fraction of their income to 
save; vi) a fraction σ  of each group of population dies at the end of the period, while 
the surviving individuals decide where to locate in the next period and possibly move 
into another location.  
 
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF AN EQUILIBRIUM PATH UNDER UNION-
DETERMINED WAGES 
Equilibrium conditions in the  markets for product and physical capital 
 Considering (2), (3), (9) and (14), one can easily derive the conditions for 
equilibrium in the product market: 
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t1+ttt di,CC di,CC ,CC+C+K=)K-(1+Y δ      (16a) 
and in the market for productive assets: 
d
1+t
s
1+t K=K ,              (16b) 
where s 1+tK  are the assets held by the investors and 
d
1+tK  are the assets demanded by 
the firms at the end of t for production in t+1. 
Optimal firms' policies under union-determined wages 
 Given the perfectly transferable nature of the general skills acquired by an 
apprentice, each employer is aware that there is no guarantee that a newly hired 
worker will remain with his/her firm in the future. This is why an employer does not 
consider the future returns accruing from the on-the-job training of an apprentice: 
since the forthcoming benefit of adding a skilled worker to the stock of human capital 
available to the economy as a whole cannot be appropriated privately, the employer 
can ignore it as an insignificant externality. Therefore, the selection of the optimal 
labor policies by a firm amounts in each t to solving the static decision problem of 
maximizing (2) with respect to Sit and Ait. Given its optimal labor policies, a firm is 
able to determine at the end of t-1 the amount of Kit to borrow and install. As wages 
are union determined, it may be the case that the aggregate demand for either trained 
labor or apprentices by firms in location i is rationed. In the aggregate, it is always the 
case that  
itit MS ≤              (17a) 
and 
Ait≤ Lit.             (17b) 
 When labor demand happens to be rationed, it is reasonable to assume that the 
scarce supply of labor is evenly distributed among firms of the same location. Note 
that the union wages are not determined at the firm level and that employers cannot 
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compete for labor in short supply by raising the relevant wages in order to keep and 
poach workers, even if skills are perfectly transferable among firms (see Soskice 
1990). Therefore, with one as the normalized number of firms of location i, we can 
take (17) to be the constraints faced by each individual firm as the union wages induce 
all the available skilled and trainable workers to accept a job offer. Hence, the firm's 
choice of the labor inputs amounts to solving the static decision problem of 
maximizing (2) subject to (1) and (17). 
 The resulting optimal labor policies are: 
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The firms' net profits are a strictly increasing function of xit. In fact, using (1), (2) 
and (18), we have that:  
[ ] ittitititititnit K)-1()r+(1)v,s,k,M,x( δpipi −−= g ,       (19) 
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Given (19), the representative firm operating in i can determine its demand for capital 
at the end of t by satisfying the optimality condition 
)]-1()r1[(
K
)v,s,k,M,x(E 1+t
1+it
1+it1+it1+it1+it1+it
g
t )( δ∂
∂pi
−+= .   (20) 
 This optimality condition defines kit+1, i.e., the physical capital to skilled 
labor ratio in the firms of i, as an implicit function of the union's wage, the trainable 
labor/skilled labor ratio of i and the market interest rate: 
f(kit+1, sit+1, vit+1)= rt+1+δ, f1 <0, f2>0 and  f3<0,    (21) 
where 
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Equilibrium in the market for trainable labor and optimal unions’ policy  
 Having the optimal demand for skilled labor in (18a), we can compute the 
probability of a skilled worker located in i (before the realization of xit ) being 
employed in period t: 
)-(2n
kv1=)k,(v
1-
itit
itit αα
α
−p .                     (22) 
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 By using (22), we can write the period utility expected (before the realization 
of xit ) by a skilled worker located in i: 
)w()-(2n
kv)v()-(2n
kv1=)w,k,(v t
1-
itit
it
1-
itit
titit
sk uuu
αααα
αα
+



− .   (23) 
 Similarly, we can use (18b) to compute the probability that a trainable worker 
located in i (before the realization of xit) will be hired in period t: 
( )[ ] 0< and 0> 0,< ,
s)-2(n
1s+1kv1=)s,k,(v 321
it
2
2
it
1-
itit
ititit qqqq Ω
−Ω
−
−
αα
µ αα
.    (24) 
Note that q(.) diminishes as a larger number of inexperienced workers actively search 
a job, remaining constant both the size of the skilled workforce and the stock of 
capital located in i. In equilibrium, the number of inexperienced workers who decide 
to search for a job in location i must be such that an inexperienced worker is 
indifferent between searching a job or staying at home: 
( ) )]U-)(U-(1)(w-)v([s,k,vc)( unitskittitititit σµ += uuqh ,   (25a) 
where along an equilibrium path 
).-(1  ,U)w(U un 1ittunit σβφφβ ≡+= +u      (25b) 
 The period utility function of a skilled worker depends on the real wage and 
on the physical capital/skilled labor ratio, which is a predetermined variable when a 
local union sets the wage. Given the forward looking behavior of firms and unskilled 
workers captured by (21) and (25), the current wage policy of the union cannot affect 
the union’s future policy and the utility of its members. As a consequence, a local 
union must solve the following sequence of static problems 
)w,k,(vmax tititsk
v it
u ,         (26) 
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from which we obtain the following sequence of first-order conditions: 
0
v
)w,k,v(
it
titit
sk
=
∂
∂u
,       (27) 
defining implicitely the time-invariant wage rule  
vit=v(kit,wt), v1>0, v2>0.        (28) 
 Using (28), one can obtain the equation governing the equilibrium path of the 
lifetime well-being of a skilled worker: 
sk
1ttt1t1t
sksk
t U)w),w,(k,(kU +++ += φβ vu ,     (29) 
where the subscript denoting the location is dropped. Indeed, an equilibrium pair 
{ } { }( )∞∞ 1t1t k,s , which satisfies (21), (25), (28) and (29) for exogenously given 
trajectories of rt and wt, and which converges to a steady state ( )k,s  (the bar denotes 
the steady-state value of a variable as wages are union determined), depends on 
structural parameters assumed to be equal across locations. Therefore, different 
locations display equal physical capital/skilled labor and trainable labor/skilled labor 
ratios even if they are endowed with different stocks of physical capital and skilled 
labor. Hence, local unions are induced to set the same wage in all locations and 
workers can be indifferent among locations, enjoying the same well-being 
everywhere. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that at the beginning of each period the 
skilled workers are evenly distributed across locations: 
Mit=Mt/n, ∀t>0.        (30) 
Note that the unskilled workers are indifferent with respect to the choice of a location 
because the utility level that they can reach by undertaking some home activity is 
equal in all locations, and the expected lifetime well-being of an unskilled worker 
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conditional on his/her active participation in the job market is made equal in all 
locations to this minimum level of utility by the action of market forces.  
Investors’ optimal policy and general equilibrium path 
 For given time profiles of rW and wt, the equilibrium path of st and kt is 
governed by the following system of difference equations:  
0)w,k,s, w,k,s( ttt1t1t1t =Ψ +++       (31a) 
and 
,r))w,(k,s,k( 1t1t1t1t1t δ+= +++++ vf      (31b) 
where
-)w,k),w,k((-)]w(-))w,k(([-)sk),w,k((
c)((.) 1t1t1t1tskttt
tttt
++++=Ψ vu
uvu
vq
h
φ
µ
φ
))wk(()s,k),w,k((
c)(
- 1t,1t
1t1t1t1t
++
++++
+ vu
vq
h µ  is obtained by using (25) to 
eliminate  sktU  and 
sk
1tU + in (29). 
 To characterize a general equilibrium path of this economy, one must 
determine the time profile of the interest rate by solving the optimizing problem of the 
representative investor. The investors’ optimal plan must satisfy 
)C(')C(')r1( intin+1t1t gg =+ +θ       (32a) 
and 
0)C(g'Klim inttt
t
=
∞→
θ ,        (32b) 
where from (1), (2), (3), (4), (16), (19), (24) and (30) we have that along an 
equilibrium path 
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Note that in economies characterized by the same ratios st and kt, 
in
tC  depends on the 
scale of production, i.e, on the  endowment of skilled labor Mt. Note also that if an 
acceleration of economic growth generates an increase in firms’ future profits (and 
future dividends), the resulting wealth effect would tend to boost current consumption, 
thus reducing the resources necessary to feed the growth process, in the absence of an 
offsetting movement of the real interest rate. Higher interest rates are required in order 
to induce the rentiers to increase their savings so as to meet the higher investment 
demand associated with the acceleration of growth.  
 We have from (31b), (32a) and (33a) that for equilibrium in the capital market 
the following condition must hold: 
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 For commonly used specifications of the investors’ utility function, the 
equilibrium trajectories of kt and st are independent of the scale of the formal segment 
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of the economy, i.e., they do not depend on the size of the skilled workforce. For 
instance, if we let 
1,0 ,
1
)(C)C(
-1in
tin
t <≤
−
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ζ
g                              (35) 
condition (34) can be rewritten as  
0)w,k,s,w,k,s,(k ttt1t1t1t2t =Φ ++++ ,       (36) 
where −=Φ ++++ ))w,(k,s,k((.) 1t1t1t1t vf
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 Therefore, if the wage is union determined, the investors’ utility function is 
given by (35) and the monetized value of undertaking some home activity is  supposed 
to be fixed at w, a general equilibrium path of kt and st must satisfy (31a), (32b) and 
(36), where wt+1=wt=w.  
Balanced growth path 
 Steady-state values of kt and st can be found by setting kt=kt+1=kt+2 and 
st=st+1 in (31a) and (36). Indeed, a steady-state pair )s,k(  must satisfy the system 
0s) k,( =Ψ ,                    (37a) 
0s),(k =Φ ,                   (37b) 
where (37a) must hold in order to ensure long-term equilibrium in the market for 
trainable labor, and (37b) must hold in order to ensure long-term equilibrium in the 
market for (physical) capital.  
 Equation (37a) implicitly defines s as an increasing function of k (see fig. 1):  
s=a(k), a’ >0.                 (38a)  
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Given the number of skilled workers existing in the economy, more physical capital is 
necessary to induce an increasing number of unskilled workers to participate in the 
labor market. Other things being equal, a larger number of unskilled workers 
searching for a job as apprentices depresses any single unskilled worker’s probability 
of being hired. Thus, this larger s needs to be accomodated by a higher capital stock, 
which entails both a higher probability of being hired and  better lifetime prospects for 
any single worker if hired.  
 In contrast, equation (37b) implicitly defines s as a function of k that can be 
increasing or decreasing in its argument: 
s=b(k), 0 ' ≥<b .                     (38b) 
This ambiguity depends on the forces acting on the two sides of the capital market. On 
the demand side, a rise in s has a positive effect on the firms’ expected profits: at any 
level of the capital stock, the increment in expected profits due to a marginally higher 
k increases with s. Thus, firms demand more physical capital at any given interest rate 
as s becomes larger. On the supply side, a larger s has a positive wealth effect on 
investors, since it boosts future growth and profits. Thus, at any given rate of return on 
capital, investors are willing to consume more and devote fewer resources to capital 
accumulation when they expect a larger s. Combining demand and supply forces, it 
follows straightforwardly that a larger s pushes up the equilibrium rate of return on 
capital, while the overall effect on k is ambiguous. If the investors’ preference for 
smoothing consumption over time is relatively strong (i.e., if their coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, ,ζ  tends to be large), they require a large increase in r in order 
to increase saving in the face of improved growth prospects. Hence, the rise in s will 
depress k, but to an extent that is not sufficient  to undermine the improvement in the 
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growth prospects. Therefore, in this case 0 ' <b . The opposite case holds if the 
investors’ period utility is close to increase linearly in consumption (relatively small 
ζ ). 
 It is evident from fig. 1 that  0 ' <b  is sufficient to have a unique steady-state 
pair )s,k( . We assume here that this condition holds.22 By linearizing the system 
consisting of (31a) and (36) about its steady state, one can check that the linearized 
system typically exhibits saddle-path stability:23 for any initial condition k0 in a 
neighborhood of )s,k( , the linearized system characterizes a unique path converging 
to it. 
 
                                                      
22
 The case in which multiple steady-states are possible is considered in section 6. 
23
 As a numerical example, if we let  h(c)=.027577, u(vt)=vt and u(w)=w=.5, n=1, 
,5.==Ω µ  .01238, .71, .97954, .80808, /3,2 .01, ====== δζτβασ  we get 
3.138k = , 2.s =  and .9006815.v =  Using the fact that 
)-1(1
t
tt )-(2n
w-2v)(vk
α
αα 


== k , one can rewrite (31a) and (36) as a system of difference 
equations in st and vt. Linearizing the system thus obtained around )v,s( , one can derive the 
following characteristic equation of the linearized system: 
01.1571009-3441234.33.1862072- 23 =+ λλλ , where 
1.2775535 ,8834503. 21 == λλ  and 1.02520343 =λ  are the solving characteristic roots, 
implying saddle-path stability. 
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   FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 As kt and st reach their steady-state values, employment and output follow 
their balanced growth path. Along this path, employment and output grow at their 
steady-state rate, which is determined only by the parameters of the model: 
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 Along a balanced growth path, the interest rate increases with the growth rate 
of the economy, since a higher permanent rate of growth is associated with a higher 
rate of return on capital: 
k  
k 
b(k) 
a(k) 
s
s 
  33 
 
θ
ρ
θ
σ ζζζ )1()]s,kw),,k((s1[)-1(
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 The fact that along both a transition path and along a balanced growth path the 
rate of growth does not depend on the scale of the economy has the important 
implication that economies with identical parameters’ values (structurally similar) but 
with different initial endowments of skilled labor and physical capital may differ 
permanently with respect to their levels of Mt, Kt and output.
24
 Moreover,
 
if the 
population grows at the same rate in both economies, their per capita output will not 
converge over time.25 Finally, steady-state wages and probabilities of employment for 
both skilled and trainable workers are equal in unionized economies sharing the same 
parameters values even if their employment rate will never converge. Note that this 
occurs with the wage-setting process taking place independently in each economy (it 
is not the degree of centralization in wage bargaining that matters, but rather the fact 
that structurally and institutionally similar economies converge to the same steady-
state value of kt even if their endowments of skilled labor and physical capital remain 
different). As an implication, there is no incentive for workers located in the poorer 
economy to migrate to the richer economy, which is the economy where the steady-
state proportion of the total population consisting of skilled workers is higher. 
                                                      
24
 Even along the transition path, two economies with identical parameters but endowed with 
different initial stocks of skilled labor and physical capital can grow at an identical rate if their 
initial physical capital-skilled labor ratios are the same.  
25
 Consistently with the model, one can rule out the possibility that the steady-state rate of 
growth of the skilled population is higher than the steady-state rate of growth of the working 
population by endogeneizing the birth rate of the working population, ie., by assuming that in 
the long run it responds to economic conditions and accomodates Mρ , and/or (if the 
“economy” does not coincide with the world economy) by allowing inter-country flows of 
unskilled workers. 
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An exercise of comparative dynamics  
 Among other possible experiments, it may be of interest to verify the effects 
on the steady-state rate of growth of a change in µ , namely in the fraction of the 
experienced workers’ wage that firms pay to their newly hired employees.   
 To analyze these effects we consider the capital market. Using (36), (37b) and 
(38a), one sees that the steady-state value of k must satisfy 
=δ-w))(k,k),(k,( vaf 1-)]k)(k,w),k,((k)(1[)-1(
θ
σ ζζ avqa+
,    (41) 
where for optimality on the demand side of the capital market we must have  
=δ-w))(k,k),(k,( vaf r, and for optimality on the supply side of the capital market 
we must have 1-)]k)(k,w),k,((k)(1[)-1(
θ
σ ζζ avqa+
=r (see fig.2). Equation (41) 
states the condition that must be satisfied for long-run equilibrium in the capital 
market only in terms of k by considering only those values of s that are consistent for 
given values of k with long-run equilibrium of the trainable-labor market.  
 First we consider only the direct impact of an increase in µ  on the long-run 
equilibrium of the capital market: that is, we ignore the impact that the change in µ  
exerts on the capital market through its effects on the long-run equilibrium of the 
trainable-labor market. On the demand side of the capital market, the larger µ  will 
depress future profitability by increasing the cost of trainable labor, thus inducing 
firms to reduce k at any given level of s and r (the demand curve moves leftwards in 
fig.2). Together with the fact that it is less convenient for firms to hire new workers, 
this tends to lower the rate of growth of the economy. By itself, the prospect of a 
slowing economy depresses future investors’ dividends relatively to current dividends. 
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Hence, investors are induced to save more at any given interest rate in order to 
preserve their preferred time-profile of consumption (the supply curve moves 
rightwards in fig. 2). As a result, the two curves will intersect at a lower steady-state 
rate of interest associated with a lower growth path. 
 
    FIGURE 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Let us now consider the impact exerted by a larger µ  on the capital market by 
affecting the combinations of k and s consistent with long-run equilibrium on the 
trainable-labor market.  
 Other things being equal, a higher entry-wage reduces the chances of a 
trainable worker  being hired, and therefore of acquiring the requisite skills. This 
makes the participation in the  labor market less attractive. On the other hand, if the 
worker is lucky enough to be hired, s/he can enjoy higher pay in her/his first period of 
job tenure. This makes participation in the labor market more attractive. The former 
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effect tends to dominate, especially if workers do not discount the future too heavily, 
and if they give weight in their choices to the better prospects  that they can enjoy 
during their lifetime once they have acquired the requisite skills on the job. However, 
one cannot rule the possibility that the latter effect may predominate. 
 If the depressing effect of a larger µ  on labor market participation 
predominates, steady-state equilibrium on the trainable-labor market requires that 
fewer workers participate in the labor market for any given stock of physical capital 
and size of the skilled workforce. This negatively affects expected firms’ profitability, 
thereby causing a further leftward movement of the demand curve in fig. 2. Other 
things being equal, a reduced endowment of trainable workers depresses the growth 
prospects of the economy, thus influencing investors’ behavior and determining a 
further rightward movement of the supply curve in fig. 2. 
 In contrast, if the larger µ  has a boosting effect on labor market participation, 
more trainable workers will be consistent with long-run equilibrium of the labor 
market for given stocks of skilled labor and physical capital. This can partially offset 
the direct impact that the change in µ  has on the capital market, thus limiting the 
reduction in the steady-state rate of growth brought about by the rise in the 
apprentices’ relative wage. 
 
4. CHARACTERIZATION OF AN EQUILIBRIUM PATH WHEN THE WAGE 
DETERMINATION IS COMPETITIVE 
Equilibrium wage rates and optimal firms’ policies 
 Employment of skilled labor in location i is given by substituting wt for vit in 
(18a). Similarly, employment of trainable labor in location i is given by substituting 
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it
min
it vfor  e µ  in (18b). Wage rates consistent with competition in the markets for 
skilled and trainable labor are the following:  
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where  t
min
it w
e ≥
Ω
. Skilled workers’ wages may even fall to the minimum wage 
required to induce a skilled worker to accept a job offer when the local shocks are 
adverse, while a rise in them is bounded by the competition of inexperiences workers 
when shocks are more favourable. Indeed, when the shock is favourable enough to 
make it convenient for firms to employ not only all the available skilled workers but 
also some trainable workers 



Ω
>
αα -1it
min
it
it k
e
x , market forces operate so as to 
determine wage rates at which firms are indifferent between hiring a skilled worker or 
hiring an apprentice. The apprentices’ wage rises above minite  to eliminate excess 
demand for apprentices only when local shocks are highly favourable and even the 
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entire trainable workforce is employed 
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vit to increase together with eit.  
 Firms’ net profits are now given by 
ittititititit
n
it K)(r-)v,s,k,M,x( δpipi += g ,  ( )
)1(
it
1
it
itit
g
v
xkM1(.)
α
α
αα
αpi
−








−= ,       (43) 
where vit is given in (42a). 
 The representative firm operating in i is able to determine its demand for 
capital at the end of t by satisfying the optimality condition (20), where the skilled 
workers’ wage is nowgiven in (42a) and the firms’ gross profit function is given in 
(43).  This optimality condition defines kit+1 as an implicit function of the reservation 
wage of the trainable workers located in i, of the trainable labor/skilled labor ratio of i, 
and of the market interest rate: 
z(kit+1, sit+1, min1ite + ,wt+1)=(rt+1+δ), z1<0, z2>0, z3<0 and z4<0,                        (44) 
where 
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Skilled workers’ utility and unskilled-labor market equilibrium 
 The period utility expected (before realization of xit) by a skilled worker 
located in i is the following: 
)]v([E~)w,e,s,(k itttminitititsk uu = , 0, 0, 0, 0, skwske
sk
s
sk
k tminititit
>><> uuuu      (45)    
where vit is given by (42a).    
 Given the stock of physical capital installed by the i firms, the expected 
lifetime utility of a trainable worker located in i tends to decrease with the number of 
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inexperienced workers on search within the area. This number must therefore adjust so 
as to equalize the utility loss associated with the search activity to the differential in 
lifetime well-being that an individual may expect if s/he participates in the labor 
market instead of staying at home: 
)U-U)(-1()w(-)]e([E~c)( unitskittitt σ+= uuh ,                                               (46a) 
where, considering that eit is given by (42b), one has    
0 ,0 ,0  ),e,s,k()]e([E~ minek
min
ititititt ><>= eeeeu s .                                    (46b) 
Given (10) and (50b), one can rewrite (50a) as 
min
it
min
ititit e-)e,s,k(c)( eh = ,                (46c)  
which implicitly defines minite  as a function of kit and sit: 
0 ,0  ),s,k(e kititminit <>= smmm .               (46d) 
 Along an equilibrium path, the lifetime expected utility of an unskilled worker 
is still governed by (25b), while   
sk
1t1t1t1,t1it1t
sk
t U)w),sk(,s,k(U ++++++ += φβ musk ,             (47)  
where the subscript denoting the location is dropped. Indeed, an equilibrium pair 
{ } { }( )∞∞ 1t1t s,k , which satisfies (25b) and (44)-(47) for exogenously given trajectories 
of rt and wt, and which converges to )sˆ,kˆ(  (the hat denotes the steady-state value of a 
variable as the wages are competitively determined), depends only on structural 
parameters that are invariant across locations. Given the workers’ indifference to 
locations, it is still assumed that at the beginning of each period the skilled workers 
are evenly distributed across locations as in (30). 
General equilibrium path 
 For given time profiles of rW and wt, the equilibrium path of st and kt is 
governed by the following system of difference equations:  
0)w,k,s, w,k,s( ttt1t1t1t =Λ +++       (48a) 
and 
  40 
,r)w),s,(k,s,k( 1t1t1t1t1t1t δ+= ++++++ mz      (48b) 
where
-)w),s,k(,s,(k-))s,k(,s,k(-)w(c)((.) 1t1t1t1t1tskttttt +++++
+
=Λ mumeuh φ
))sk(,s,k(c)(- 1t,1t1t1t +++++ meh  is obtained by using (25b) and (46a) to eliminate  
sk
tU  and 
sk
1tU + in (47). 
 A general equilibrium path of this economy with competitive determination of 
wages can be characterized, by using the investors’ optimality conditions (32), where 
now along an equilibrium path 
)w,k),s,k(,s,k(
n
MC t1tttttt
in
t += mD ,                    (49a)  
1tttttttttttt nk)]s,k),s,k((s)[1-1(-)]nk-(1)w),s,k(,s,k([(.) +++= mqmzD σδ
 and 
)]s,k),s,k((s1[)M-1(M tttttt1t mq+=+ σ .     (49b) 
Note that q(.), which is the fraction of the trainable workforce hired in t, is obtained by 
substituting t
min
t vfor  e µ in (24). 
 Considering the optimality conditions for demand and supply of capital,  
equilibrium in the capital market implies 
0)w,s,k,w,s,k,(k ttt1t1t1t2t =Π ++++ ,     (50) 
where −=Π +++++ )w),s,k(,s,k((.) 1t1t1t1t1t mz
[ ] .-1)k,w,)s,k(,s,k()-1(
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++++++
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mDmq
        
 Therefore, if the wage is determined competitively, the investors’ utility 
function is given by (35) and the monetized value of the workers’ outside option is 
fixed at w, a general equilibrium path of kt and st must satisfy (32b), (48a) and (50), 
where wt+1=wt=w. Note that along this path the dynamics of kt and st do not depend 
on the size of the skilled workforce Mt or on stock of physical capital Kt. 
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Balanced growth path 
 A steady-state pair )sˆ,kˆ(  must satisfy the system 
0s) k,( =Λ ,                 (51a) 
0s),(k =Π ,                 (51b) 
where (51a) must hold if long-term equilibrium in the market for trainable labor is to 
be ensured, and (51b) must hold if long-term equilibrium in the market for (physical) 
capital is to be ensured.  
 Equation (51a) implicitly defines s as an increasing function of k:  
s=i(k), i’ >0.                 (52a)  
 As under union-determined wages, the equation that any combinations of k 
and s must satisfy in order to ensure steady-state equilibrium in the capital market 
implicitly defines s as a function of k which may be increasing or decreasing in its 
argument: 
s=n(k), 0 ' ≥<n .                   (52b) 
This ambiguity has the motivations discussed in the previous section, and we restrict 
our attention to the case n’<0, 26 which is sufficient to obtain a unique steady-state pair 
)sˆ,kˆ( . Furthermore, by linearizing the system consisting of (48a) and (50) about its 
steady state, one can check that the linearized system typically exhibits saddle-path 
stability:27 for any initial condition k0 in a neighborhood of )sˆ,kˆ( , the linearized 
system characterizes a unique path converging to it.  
                                                      
26
 As in the previous section, a relatively large ζ  (coefficient of relative risk aversion) ensures 
that n‘<0. 
27
 As a numerical example, if we take the same parameter values and the same functional form 
of the workers’ utility function used in the example of the previous section (see note 23), one 
obtains 2kˆ =  and 2.sˆ = . By linearizing the system consisting of (48a) and (50) around this 
steady-state pair, one can derive the following characteristic equation of the linearized system: 
01.5460953-5505695.65.9724664- 23 =+ λλλ , where .329616,1 =λ  
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 As kt and st reach their steady-state values, employment and output follow 
their balanced growth path. Along this path, employment and output grow at their 
steady-state rate ASY ˆˆ += ρρ , which is determined in this case, too, only by the 
parameters of the model:  
1)]sˆ,kˆ),sˆ,kˆ((sˆ1[)-1(ˆˆ ASY −+== + mqσρρ .     (53) 
 At steady state, the interest rate is higher as the economy grows faster: 
 
θ
ρ
θ
σ ζζζ )ˆ1()]sˆ,kˆ),sˆ,kˆ((sˆ1[)-1(
rˆ1 Y+=+=+ mq .                                           (54) 
 It is worth noting that with competitive wages, too, the rate of growth does not 
depend on the scale of the economy, and thus economies with different initial 
endowments of skilled labor and physical capital may grow at the same rate forever, 
and differ permanently with respect to their levels of Mt, Kt and output. Rather than 
depending on the modality of wage determination, the permanent influence of the 
initial conditions stems from the fact that the availability of a large (small) skilled 
workforce, which is the product of past history, attracts abundant (scarce) physical 
capital, whose presence induces a large (small) number of individuals to qualify for 
acquiring skills on the job.  However—as we shall see in the next section--this fact by 
itself is not sufficient to generate hysteresis.       
Competitive determination of wages versus union determination of wages: comparing 
the balanced growth paths 
 At the end of the previous section, we saw how a larger µ  (which is the 
fraction of the experienced workers’ wage that firms pay to their newly hired 
employees under union determination of wages) may lower the steady-state rate of 
growth of the economy. Thus, it is fair to compare the growth performances of the 
                                                                                                                                             
.013154112 =λ  and 6296962.43 =λ  are the solving characteristic roots, implying saddle-
path stability. 
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economy under competitive wage determination and under union wage determination 
by assuming that Ω→µ , i.e., by assuming that, with union wage setting, the pay 
differential between experienced workers and apprentices tends fully to reflect the 
productivity differential between them. Even under these circumstances, 
w)k,(e vΩ=  is typically higher than k))(k,(emin dm=  at any level of k: since 
w)k,(e vΩ=  is linked to the skilled workers’ wage that unions negotiate by 
exploiting their members’ monopoly over the required skills, it tends to be higher than 
the minimum wage at which the trainable workers are willing to work when wages are 
determined competitively. Similarly, the skilled workers’ wage is on average lower at 
any level of k in the absence of monopoly unions negotiating wages in each location.   
 To analyze the effects of these differences in expected wage cost on the 
balanced growth path of the economy, we can use (50), (51b) and (52a) to verify that 
under competitive determination of wages the steady-state value of k must satisfy 
=δ-w)k)),(,k(k),(k,( imiz r1-)]k)(k,k)),(k,((k)(1[)-1( =+
θ
σ ζζ iimqi
, (55) 
where for optimality on the demand side of the capital market we must have  
r-w)k)),((k,k),(k,( =δimiz , and for optimality on the supply side of the capital 
market we must have r1-)]k)(k,k)),(k,((k)(1[)-1( =+
θ
σ ζζ iimqi (see the dotted-
line curves in fig. 3).  
 In the spirit of the previous section, for analytical purposes we distinguish 
between the direct impact that institutional differences in wage determination exert on 
the long-run equilibrium of the capital market and the impact that they exert on it by 
affecting the long-run equilibrium of the trainable labor market (by affecting the 
number of unskilled workers willing to participate in this market).  Let us suppose that 
an unionized economy is subject to a reform which shifts its wage-setting institutions 
toward competitive wage determination. Along the new (k,s) schedule that is 
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consistent with long-run equilibrium of the capital market, firms will demand more 
capital at any level of s and r because the expected marginal profitability of capital is 
boosted by the reduction in expected labor cost (the demand curve in fig. 3 shifts 
rightwards). Other things being equal, this tends to accelerate steady-state growth and 
to increase future profits relatively to current ones, thereby inducing investors to save 
less at any level of s and r (the supply curve in fig. 3 shifts leftwards). As a result, the 
two curves will intersect at a higher steady-state rate of return on capital, which is 
associated with a higher balanced growth path. 
 
   FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Next, consider the effect that long-term adjustment in the trainable labor 
market will have on the steady-state growth rate. As wages respond to competitive 
forces rather than being union determined, the average entry-wage tends to decline at 
any given k and s. Other things being equal, this raises the number of new jobs created 
for apprentices. The greater probability of finding a job as apprentice may induce 
more people to invest in labor market participation even if they expect to receive 
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lower wages once hired. If this is the case, a lower k is required for long-run 
equilibrium of the trainable labor market for any given level of s. This will strenghten 
the forces already at work on the two sides of the capital market. In the opposite case, 
in which the negative influence on labor market participation exerted by lower 
expected wages predominates over the positive influence determined by the higher 
probability of finding a job, the adjustments required for long-run equilibrium in the 
trainable labor market may partially offset the movements of the two curves in the 
(K,r) plane resulting from the institutional shift toward competitive wage 
determination. In this case, indeed, the relative scarcity of trainable workers can 
attenuate the positive impact on expected profitability of lower labor costs. In both 
cases, however, we end up having YYˆ ρρ >  and rrˆ ≥ :
28
 a competitive wage-setting 
process creates a more dynamic environment in which the economy can grow at a 
perpetual rate higher than that possible under union determination of wages. 
Economies characterized by the same structural parameters have different long-term 
growth performances, depending on the their labor-market institutions.   
 An important caveat to this conclusion is that, in general, a reform which 
gives rise to competitive wage determination is not Pareto improving: along a 
balanced growth path the skilled workers (the “insiders” of this economy) are 
typically better off when wages are union determined.29  
 
                                                      
28
 We have 1-rrˆ -1θ==  if and only if 0=ζ . Taking the numerical examples of note 23 
and 27, in which the same parameters’ values were assigned to  economies differing for the 
modalities of wage determination (and in which Ω→µ  under union determination of 
wages), we have  0023.0648362.ˆ YY =>= ρρ  and 0328839.r0782335.rˆ =>=  
29
 In the numerical examples of note 23 and 27, we have 
.8848935.2Uˆ1168365.3U sksk =>=  
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5. CHARACTERIZATION OF AN EQUILIBRIUM PATH IN A TWO-REGION 
ECONOMY  
 Suppose now that the two economies we have studied in autarky open up so 
that there is a single market for capital and a single market for the only output 
produced in this two-region world. Both regions share the same parameter values, but 
they preserve their specific mode of wage determination. Markets for skilled labor 
remain distinct. This amounts to saying that skilled workers do not move from their 
own region (for instance, because interregional mobility is relatively costly), while it 
is immaterial where the investors are located since they can hold assets of both 
regions.  
 Consistently with previous assumptions, the large number of identical 
investors (the firms’ owners) operating in the world economy is normalized to be two. 
Again, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that all investors are 
entitled to receive an equal share of the firms’ net profits. The representative investor 
must decide a contingency plan for intC  and Kt+1 in order to maximize: 

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gθ ,         (56) 
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pipi +
++≤+  where rt is the world interest rate, 
and the subscripts “U” and “M” denote a variable which belongs—respectively--to the 
region in which the wages are union determined and to the region in which the wages 
are market determined. 
 Equilibrium in the market for productive assets requires: 
MtUtt KK=2K + ,               (57) 
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and the condition for equilibrium in the product market is the following: 
.CCCCC2K2)K)(K-1(YY unMtunUtskMtskUtint1tMtUtMtUt +++++=+++ +δ       (58)  
 The investors’ optimal plan must satisfy (32), where now along an equilibrium 
path  
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++ mD ,              (59) 
the motion of MUt is governed by (33b), the motion of MMt is governed by (49b) and 
wt+1=wt=w. 
 An equilibrium path of the world economy is characterized by (31), (32b), 
(33), (48), (49) and by 
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The world interest rate reflects both the anticipation of (relatively) high future profits 
generated by the firms located in the more dynamic region and the anticipation of 
(relatively) low future profits made by the firms located in the low-growth region. 
During the transition to a balanced growth path, this allows the high growth region to 
finance its growth process at a cost that is lower than it would be under autarky. 
Indeed, the anticipation of a lower growth path in the unionized region mitigates the 
wealth effect, which would exert a stronger upward pressure on investors’ current 
consumption—and therefore on the interest rate that they require to provide resources 
for investment—if they had claims only on the profits of firms located in the high 
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growth region. As a result, the region with competitive wage determination is able to 
grow along a transition path at a higher rate than under autarky. The opposite applies 
to the unionized region.   
 Given the investors’ utility function in (35), the world interest rate coincides 
in the long run with the steady-state interest rate characterizing--in autarky--the 
economy whose wages are determined competitively: rˆr# =  (where «#» denotes the 
steady-state value of a variable in the two-region economy). The intuition is 
straightforward: in the presence of a permanent differential of growth between the two 
regions, the share of the investors’ total income generated in each period by the firms 
located in the low-growth region becomes asymptotically insignificant, no matter what 
the initial endowments of skilled labor of the two regions may be. Therefore, in the 
long run, the equilibrium world rate of interest will reflect only the returns obtainable 
by investing in the high-growth region. As time passes, and as the scale of the high-
growth economy grows ever larger relatively to the scale of the unionized economy, 
the world capital market is increasingly dominated by the investment conditions 
prevailing in the high-growth economy.  
 An important implication of the tendency of the world interest rate 
increasingly to reflect the better opportunities for investment existing in the more 
dynamic economy is that the steady-state rate of growth of the region with union-
determined wages is lower with an integrated capital market than it is under 
autarky: SAY
#
SA
#
Y UUU ++ =<= ρρρρ . The reason should again be intuitive: the 
higher cost of capital--due to the fact that on the demand side of the capital market 
there are firms located in a region in which profitability is higher--discourages 
investment by firms located in the region with union-determined wages. In its turn, 
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this lower investment activity induces fewer individuals to participate in the labor 
market, with a further depressing effect on growth.  
 
6. POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE BALANCED GROWTH PATHS 
 The strategic complementarity between physical capital and trainable labor 
creates the possibility of multiple balanced growth paths. This is the case both in the 
presence of unions and with competitive wage determination. 
 Under union wage determination, indeed, a pair { } { }( )∞∞ 1t1t v,s  satisfying (31) 
for given trajectories of rW and wt need not be unique. In this case, the anticipation of a 
larger supply of trainable workers may increase the firms’ expected profitability, thus 
boosting the firms’ demand for capital in the economy as a whole, in spite of the 
higher union wage resulting from the more favourable trade-off between wage and 
probability of employment faced by the skilled workers due to the increased capital 
accumulation. In other words, the expected marginal profitability of (physical) capital 
may not decrease with a larger kt+1 because the more abundant supply of trainable 
labor reduces the probability of a shortage of apprentices when local circumstances 
are favourable and firms want to expand production. In its turn, the more favourable 
trade-off between probability of employment and wage leads to a higher expected 
utility for the trainable workers, thereby inducing a larger number of unskilled 
workers to participate actively in the formal labor market. This validates firms’ 
optimistic expectations. The opposite may happen if firms anticipate a smaller supply 
of trainable workers. In both cases, however, firms’ expectations may be fulfilled 
because they give rise to an increase (or a decrease) in the capital stock which induces 
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both the local unions and the unskilled workers to behave consistently with those 
expectations. 
  Under competitive wage determination, the potential for multiple balanced 
growth paths depends on the fact that the minimum wage at which the newly hired 
workers are willing to accept a job tends to decrease when the economy is expected to 
move along a higher growth path. In this case, in fact, the differential in lifetime well-
being between remaining an unskilled workers and acquiring the requisite skills is 
larger. Moreover, the increased number of workers who decide to participate in the 
labor market at any expected entry-wage moderates the apprentices’ wage in the case 
of favourable local shocks. This decline in trainable labor cost along a higher growth 
path prevents the expected marginal productivity of capital from falling as the capital-
skilled labor ratio increases. Thus, firms’ expectations of higher profitability along a 
growth path characterized by more investment in capital may be self-fulfilling 
precisely because of the increased participation in the trainable labor market that 
results from the rise in investment.  
 No matter what the modalities of wage determination are, the potential for 
multiple balanced growth paths cannot actualize itself if the equilibrium rental rate of 
capital is very sensitive to changes in capital demand. A higher growth path cannot be 
sustainable if the rise in interest rate required by the investors to meet the demand for 
the additional investment necessary to accelerate the growth process is too high 
relative to the increment in discounted profits generated by boosting growth. In 
general, in fact, the interest rate must be higher to meet a larger demand for physical 
capital in order to stimulate investors to hold more productive assets. This is 
especially true if we consider that a higher growth path is associated with an increase 
in the expected sequence of discounted  dividends paid to investors, and thus reduces 
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the amount of saving that they are willing to provide at any level of the interest rate. 
Therefore, the potential for multiple equilibrium paths is able to actualize itself only if 
the investors’ preference for smoothing consumption over time is weak (ζ  close to 
0), so that they are willing to finance higher growth for a modest increase in the rate of 
return on capital. In the limiting case in which ζ=0 (constant marginal utility of 
consumption), different permanent rates of growth are consistent with the same 
equilibrium rate of return on capital. If the rate of return on capital required by the 
investors remained unchanged as capital investment increases, there would be a larger 
differential in permanent rates of growth between a high growth and a low growth 
steady state. In these circumstances, in fact, there is no upward pressure on the cost of 
capital as firms demand more capital: no increase in the cost of capital can dampen the 
potential of a permanently higher rate of growth created by the positive externalities 
generated by the investment activity. 
 It is evident from the previous discussion why the existence of multiple 
balanced growth paths requires, under union determination of wages, that b’>0 for at 
least some range of values of k:30 along the curve giving the combinations of k and s 
consistent with the long-run equilibrium of the capital market, there must be an 
interval of values of k within which an increment of s increases the expected marginal 
profitability of capital more than the rate of return required by the investors. It is 
possible to verify that this is actually the case when multiple steady-state pairs of k 
and s exist (see figures 4 and 5). Typically, we can have two steady-state pairs 
                                                      
30
 Similarly, under competitive wage determination, the existence of multiple steady-state rate 
of growth requires that n’>0 for at least some range of values of k. The following discussion on 
multiple balanced growth paths applies also to an economy with competitive determination of 
wages. 
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)s,k( hh  and )s,k( ll , such that lh kk >  and lh ss > .31 For the case in which 0>ζ , 
numerical examples show that, linearizing the system consisting of (31a) and (36) 
around these steady states, the linearized system characterizes a unique path of kt and 
st converging to )s,k( hh  for any given k0 in a neighborhood of hk , while it 
characterizes a continuum of paths converging to )s,k( ll  for any given k0 in a 
neighborhood of lk .32 For the case in which 0=ζ , the system governing kt and st 
reduces to a single first-order difference equation, the motion of kt and st is 
completely governed by forward-looking expectations (the initial condition on k0 does 
not play a role in determining the dynamics of kt and st), and the system can 
                                                      
31
 As numerical examples, let  h(c)=9.2576516-03, u(vt)=vt and u(w)=w=.1, ,25.=Ω  
,2681247.=µ  .4333714, ,75. .03, === βασ  .025, .8617753, == ζτ  n=1, 
.28255, =δ  we get .1,kh =  2.s h = , ,0083379.hY =ρ  .0988142,kl =  1.s l =  
and .0106306.lY −=ρ  Letting h(c)=.0123832, u(vt)=vt and u(w)=w=.1, ,25.=Ω  n=1,  
,2681247.=µ  .4906097, ,75. .03, === βασ  0, .8247422, == ζτ  
.2290823, =δ  we get .1,kh =  2.s h = , ,0083379.hY =ρ  .0986489,kl =  1.s l =  
and .0106358.lY −=ρ    
32
 In the first numerical example of the preceeding note, the characteristic equation of the 
system obtained by linearizing (31a) and (36) around )s,k( hh  is the following: 
0.19149097.53313188.6241583- 23 =++ λλλ , from which one can obtain the 
characteristic roots 0147784.1 -.0247185, 21 == λλ  and ;6340984.73 =λ  while the 
characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (31a) and (36) around )s,k( ll  is 
the following: 0.28783367.68918399.0816481- 23 =++ λλλ , from which we can 
obtain the  characteristic roots 9858373. -.0359049, 21 == λλ  and .1317157.83 =λ  
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immediately jump to one of its two long-run equilibria, or it can follow one among a 
continuum of paths converging to )s,k( ll  in a neighborhood of it 33 (see fig. 6). 
 
   FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
33
 In the second numerical example of note 31, (31a) can be rewritten as a first-order difference 
equation in kt only, by using the fact that (36) implicitly defines st as a function of kt. 
Linearizing this difference equation around hk  yields the following characteristic equation: 
01.0210701- =λ , from which one can obtain the  characteristic root ;0210701.1=λ  
while the characteristic equation obtained by linearizing (31a) around lk  is the following: 
0.9812596- =λ , from which one can obtain the characteristic roots: .9812596.=λ  
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FIGURE 5 
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with )s,k( ll : l ASlYh AShY ++ =>= ρρρρ . The associated steady-state interest rates 
are: lh rr ≥ .34 
 Given the cumulative nature of the growth process, the levels of output and 
employment  of an economy moving along a path characterized by )s,k( hh  diverge 
over time from the employment and output levels of a structurally similar economy 
starting with equal initial endowments K0 and M0 but moving along a path 
characterized by )s,k( ll . This implies that in the presence of multiple balanced 
growth paths, the «animal spirits» of capital-market participants may determine 
irreversible long-lasting effects on economic performances. If capital-market 
participants are convinced that the growth path characterized by a high rate of capital 
accumulation is not sustainable because firms’ profitability will be too low to 
guarantee a sufficiently high rate of return on a larger amount of productive assets, 
their pessimism will prove self-fulfilling. Indeed, low capital investment will reduce 
workers’ investment in labor-market participation, thus depressing firms’ expected 
profitability and inducing the economy to move along a low-growth equilibrium path:  
real interest,  real wage and employment will be lower than they would be in a high 
growth scenario. The notion itself of «natural» rates of interest and unemployment 
loses its significance in this context. 
 Finally, it should be emphasized that a high-growth equilibrium path is always 
Pareto superior than a low growth path. Indeed, in a high growth regime i) investors 
enjoy a higher rate of return on their accumulated wealth, ii) the skilled workers are 
able to exploit a more favourable trade-off between real wage and the probability of 
                                                      
34
 Again, one has 1-rr -1lh θ==  if and only if 0=ζ .   
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being employed, thus increasing their expected lifetime sequence of discounted 
utilities, iii) the apprentices’ wages are higher, iv) a larger number of workers have the 
opportunity to be trained on the job and increase their human wealth, and v) the 
lifetime prospects of an unskilled worker remain unchanged. 
 
7. FISCAL TRANSFERS AND CONVERGENCE 
 The intention now is to show that once the rigidity in the value of the workers’ 
outside option is removed, namely once wt is sensitive to general economic 
conditions, the mechanism generating persistence (on-the-job-training) is unable to 
prevent initial differences in endowments of reproducible assets between economies 
similar in any other respect from fading away in the long run. The most natural way to 
do so is by assuming that the workers’ outside option depends on fiscal transfers in 
support of jobless households.  
Autarky  
 Fiscal transfers must be financed by collecting taxes: 
,)S(A-N
Tax
w
ttt
t
t +
=         (61) 
where Taxt are the total tax revenues in period t and Nt is the total number of workers 
in period t. Assuming that all the workers without jobs devote their entire income to 
consumption, the product-market equilibrium condition can be rewritten as   
tttt
un
t
sk
t
in
t1ttt )]wS(A-N[CCCK)K-1(Y +++++=+ +δ .  (62) 
 The tax base is the income on wealth that is not reinvested (capital investment 
is tax deductable), namely that portion of the investors’ income devoted to 
consumption. Therefore, in the case of union-determined wages, we have 
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1,0 ),k,s,k),w,k((
n
MTax 1ttttttt <<= + γγ vC     (63) 
where γ  is the tax rate and C(.) is given in (33a). An economy with a low 
employment rate is both an economy in which the tax base for financing the welfare 
benefits paid to the jobless is reduced and an economy in which there is a large 
number of households to support with fiscal transfers. The combination of these two 
effects inevitably decreases the value of the workers’ outside option.   
 To model the dynamics of wt, we must use the laws of motion of Nt and 
At+St. The total population of workers evolves according to: 
,0 ,)N-1(N t1t >+=+ ξξσ           (64) 
where ξ  is the birth rate, while the employed workforce evolves in an unionized 
economy according to:  
)]s,k),w,k((s)k),w,k(([MAS ttttttttttt vqvp +=+ ,                 (65) 
where the dynamics of Mt is given in (33b). 
 Therefore, in an unionized economy, (61) can be rewritten as 
{ } ,N
Md ,)]s,k),w,k((s)k),w,k(([d-1n
)k,s,k),w,k((d
w
t
t
t
ttttttttt
1tttttt
t ≡+
=
+
vqvp
vCγ
  (66a) 
where dt evolves according to  
ξσ
σ
+
+
=+
-1
)]s,k),w,k((s1[)-1(dd tttttt1t
vq
, d0 given.    (67a) 
 Adding equations (66a) and (67a) to (31a) and (36) yields the extended system 
in kt, st, and dt governing the evolution of the unionized economy when wt is 
determined endogenously. Note that kt, st, and dt determine the dynamics of the 
employment rate (empratet), since 
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.
N
SA
emprate )],s,k),w,k((s)k),w,k(([demprate
t
tt
ttttttttttt
+
≡+= vqvp  (68a) 
 Similarly, under competitive wage determination, (61) can be rewritten as  
{ },)]s,k),s,k((s)k,w([d-1n
)w,k),s,k(,s,k(d
w
tttttttt
t1tttttt
t
mqp
mD
+
=
+γ
    (66b) 
where p(.), which is the fraction of the skilled workforce employed in t, is obtained by 
substituting wt for vt in (22), and dt evolves according to 
ξσ
σ
+
+
=+
-1
)]s,k),s,k((s1[)-1(dd tttttt1t
mq
, d0 given.    (67b) 
 Adding equations (66b) and (67b) to (48a) and (50) yields the extended 
system in kt, st, and dt governing the evolution of the economy under competitive 
wage setting when wt is determined endogenously. In this case, we have  
)]s,k),s,k((s)k,w([demprate ttttttttt mqp += .    (68b) 
 Once wt is allowed to respond to general economic conditions, the workers 
living in an economy which inherits lower stocks of physical capital and skilled labor 
from the past have poorer alternative options if they remain out of work than do the 
workers of a region that has inherited from the past higher stocks of physical capital 
and skilled labor. Wage determination will be affected by this difference in the value 
of the workers’ outside option. An adjustment process, therefore, takes place which 
induces economies characterized by the same structural and institutional features but 
with different initial endowments of skilled labor and capital to converge in the long 
run to the same output level, «natural» rate of employment and value of the workers’ 
ouside option.  
 This adjustment process occurs under both union and competitive wage 
determination. Indeed, by setting kt+2=kt+1=kt, st+1=st and dt+1=dt in equations 
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(66a), (67a), (31a) and (36), one can obtain a steady-state triple (k*,s*,d*), which 
implies that under union determination of wages the steady-state employment rate, 
emprate*, depends only on the parameter values of the economy, and that the steady-
state rate of growth of the economy coincides with the rate of growth of the workers’ 
population. Similarly, in the case in which wages are determined competitively, one 
can obtain a steady-state triple (k°,s°,d°), which implies that the steady-state 
employment rate, emprate°, depends only on the parameter values of the economy, 
and that the steady-state rate of growth of the economy coincides with the rate of 
growth of the workers’ population. However, one can check that emprate°>emprate*: 
steady-state levels of output per capita and employment rate (the natural employment 
rate) are higher in an economy with competitive wage determination than they are in 
an unionized economy. Indeed, as the process of wage determination is dominated by 
the insiders, ceteris paribus the wage pressure is stronger. Therefore, the value of the 
outside option must be lower in order to keep labor cost under control and to stimulate 
firms to invest at a rate which allows the economy to grow at the same rate as the 
workers’ population (w°>w*). Given the tax rate γ, the value of the outside option is 
lower if and only if the level of output per capita and the employment rate are lower.  
 Another important implication of the existence of fiscal transfers in favour of 
the jobless is that--given the modalities of wage determination--a higher tax rate tends 
to depress the natural employment rate: 0*emprate <
∂
∂
γ
and 0emprate <
∂
°∂
γ
. As a 
larger share of total resources is devoted to supporting the jobless, the steady-state rate 
of employment must decline in order to prevent w* (or w° in the case of competitive 
wage determination) from increasing and pushing up the wages. Higher wages, 
indeed, would be inconsistent with that rate of capital of capital investment required to 
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make the economy grow at the same rate as the workers’ population. Since both w* 
and w° do not change with γ, one can conclude that—given the modalities of wage 
determination—a steady state associated with a lower γ is Pareto superior with respect 
to a steady state associated with a higher γ. In fact, at the steady state associated with a 
lower γ, fewer workers are jobless, investors’ consumption is higher, while the 
employed and the jobless workers have the same income. However, along a transition 
path, workers can be worse off when the share of resources devoted to support the 
jobless is reduced because in the short term this will lower the value of their outside 
option.    
 Two-region economy   
 Suppose that two regional economies sharing the same parameters’ values and 
the same wage-setting institutions are fully integrated and that investors’ consumption 
is taxed by the national government in order to pay equal benefits to all the jobless no 
matter in which region they are located. For simplicity and without loss of generality, 
we assume that the two regions have the same initial population (NN0=NS0=N0) and 
physical capital to skilled labor ratio (kN0=kS0=k0),35 where the subscripts «N» and 
«S» denote, respectively, the «northern» region and «southern» region of this two-
region economy. 
 Consistently with section 5, the equations for equilibrium in the market for 
productive assets and in the product market can be rewritten, respectively, as  
2Kt=KNt=KSt                            (69) 
and  
                                                      
35
 Given this assumption on the initial physical capital-skilled labor ratio, it is not only at steady 
state but also along a transition path that no worker is willing to migrate into the other region 
even if the cost of moving is negligible.  
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 In an unionized economy, each workless household receives a net benefit 
given by 
{ },)]s,k),w,k((s)k),w,k(()[d(d-2n
)k,s,k),w,k(()dd(
w
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where dNt and dSt evolve, respectively, according to  
ξσ
σ
+
+
=+
-1
)]s,k),w,k((s1[)-1(dd tttttNt1Nt
vq
, dNt given,                
(72a) 
and 
ξσ
σ
+
+
=+
-1
)]s,k),w,k((s1[)-1(dd tttttSt1St
vq
, dSt given.                 (72b) 
 Adding equations (72) to (31a) and (36) yields the extended system in kt, st, 
dNt and dSt governing the evolution of the two-region unionized economy when wt is 
determined endogenously. 
 Since there is a unique steady-state value of the outside option that is 
consistent with employment and output growing at the same rate as population does, 
one can easily check that the natural rate of employment in the North (South) is a 
decreasing function of the natural rate of employment in the South (North): 
0
*emprate
*emprate
S
N <
∂
∂
. Indeed, given the tax rate γ , lower levels of output and employment 
in the South (North) shrink the tax base and increase the number of households in 
need of government support, thereby exerting nationwide a downward pressure on the 
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value of the workers’ outside option, which allows the North (South) to raise 
production and employment without pushing up the wages.  A similar analysis applies 
also to the case where wages are determined competitively. 
 
8. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESULTS  
 The model presented in this paper has four main implications:  
i) Structurally similar economies sharing the same modalities of wage determination 
may display permanent differentials in per capita output and employment rate. The 
presence of wage-negotiating unions has been shown to be irrelevant with respect to 
the tendency of economies characterized by the same structural features, i.e., by the 
same parameter values, forever to have different levels of per capita output and 
employment rates if their initial endowments of physical capital and skilled labor 
differ. The fact that a mechanism causing persistence (on-the-job-training) is at work 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this tendency to come about. Indeed, for 
there to be permanent disparities among structurally and institutionally similar 
economies (full hysteresis) it is crucial that jobless workers achieve an utility level 
which is immune  to movements in the volume of production and employment. In 
other words, there is an absence of convergence in the levels of output and 
employment when the monetized value of the workers’ alternative option does not 
respond to changes in output and employment. In this case, there is no incentive for 
workers to migrate into the richer economy. Conversely, as the workers’ outside 
opportunities are affected by the overall performance of the economy, structurally and 
institutionally similar economies characterized by different initial endowments of 
skilled labor and physical capital converge to the same level of output per capita and 
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to the same «natural» rate of employment, i.e., steady-state fraction of the working-
age population that is employed. 
ii) However, as the monetized value of the workers’ alternative options is rigid and 
does not respond to general economic conditions, it is shown that the modes of wage 
determination are able to affect the long-term growth path of the economy (and the 
employment level) by influencing expected profitability—and therefore the incentive 
to firms to invest—and workers’ willingness to participate in the labor market: other 
things being equal, the steady-state rate of growth is higher when wages are 
determined competitively rather than being negotiated by unions. Assessing this 
result, it should be noted that--in general--institutional reforms which shift the wage-
setting process from union determination of wages to competitive wage determination 
are not Pareto-improving: insiders prefer to have wages negotiating by their unions. 
Moreover, when the workers’ outside opportunities depend on fiscal transfers which 
respond to general economic conditions, the natural rate of employment to which an 
economy converges is higher when wages are determined competitively, and--other 
things being equal—when the tax rate is lower and a reduced share of total resources 
is devoted to supporting the jobless. Finally, in the presence of a central government 
paying equal benefits to all jobless househols living in a two-region economy, the 
natural employment rate of a region is higher—other things being equal-- the lower is 
the natural rate of employment of the other region.  
iii) The anticipation of an acceleration of growth causes a positive wealth effect due to 
the expectation of higher future firms’ profits, thus pushing current savings down. In 
the context of a closed economy, where the resources for financing the additional 
investment necessary to fuel growth can be augmented only by increasing domestic 
savings, this implies that to move the economy along a higher growth path the rate of 
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return on savings must increase so as to dominate the wealth effect and stimulate 
saving. Typically, the positive permanent effect exerted on the growth rate by some 
favourable shift in labor-market institutions or in the market psychology will be 
partially offset by a rising equilibrium cost of capital: a permanently higher growth 
rate is associated with a higher steady-state rate of interest. In the context of an open 
economy, this constraint is less binding, and the growth potentialities of an economy 
enjoying a competitive advantage due to the modalities of wage determination can be 
better exploited at the expenses of economies less able to attract  investment because 
of their labor-market institutions. Indeed, in the presence of an integrated world 
capital market, investment in a region which tends to grow more can be financed at 
least partially from abroad by attracting resources from regions in which profitability 
is expected to be lower, thereby raising the cost of capital of the latter and determining 
a larger differential between their long-term growth performances. Therefore, as the 
modalities of wage determination vary across regions, the interregional integration of 
the capital market permanently reduces the rate of growth of the region offering the 
worst prospects to investors because of the role played by the unions in wage 
determination. This is because the cost of capital (the world interest rate) tends 
asymptotically to equalize the rate of return on capital that the region characterized by 
the highest profitability and growth rate is able to offer to investors. In such a region, 
the possibility to draw from the world capital market can accelerate growth only 
temporarily, since--in the long run--the moderating influence on the world interest rate 
of the lower rate of return on investment prevailing in the less competitive regions 
tends to vanish. 
iv) When the workers’ outside option is rigid, the current state of the «fundamentals» 
may not allow determination of a unique growth path consistent with a sustainable 
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macroeconomic equilibrium: given two structurally and institutionally (sharing the 
same modalities of wage determination) similar economies having the same current 
endowments of physical capital and skilled labor, there may be a differential in growth 
performance in favour of the economy whose growth potentialities are evaluated more 
optimistically by those participating in the capital market. In this context, in fact, the 
«average opinion» of participants in the capital market may play a role in the 
«selection» of one among the multiple equilibrium paths along which an economy 
may move, while the notion of a «natural» interest rate loses its significance, since 
identical economies may move permanently along balanced growth paths associated 
with different steady-state rates of interest. 
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